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The Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause is an analytically 
gnarly beast. What seems like a fairly straightforward prohibition 
on multiple prosecutions for the same crime turns out to be a bram-
ble bush of doctrinal twists and snarls. At the center is the so-called 
dual sovereignty doctrine. This principle holds that separate sover-
eigns (for example, a state and the federal government) may prose-
cute for what looks like the same “offence”—to use the Constitution’s 
language1—because they have separate laws. And because those 
laws prohibit separate offenses, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s bar 
on multiple prosecutions for the same offense simply does not come 
into play. As a doctrine that relates to a right guaranteed by the Bill 
of Rights, it’s remarkably one-dimensional in favor of government.
In Gamble v. United States2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and built 
upon this view, or what I have called a “jurisdictional theory” of dou-
ble jeopardy.3 This theory peels back the label “sovereign” to extract 
its underlying rationale. Namely, sovereign means an entity with 
independent jurisdiction to make and apply law, or “prescriptive 
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1  The full language of the Double Jeopardy Clause reads: “nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. 
amend. V.
2  139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019).
3  Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional 
Theory, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 769, 775 (2009).
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jurisdiction,” and that prescriptive jurisdiction authorizes indepen-
dent jurisdiction to enforce law through a separate prosecution. This 
terminological move from sovereignty to jurisdiction is not just se-
mantic. Rather, it opens up analysis. The theory holds strong explan-
atory power for current double jeopardy law and practice as well as 
dynamic doctrinal and normative implications for double jeopardy 
law going forward—perhaps most of all for U.S. prosecutions relating 
to criminal activity abroad, such as human rights abuses, piracy, and 
various forms of terrorism.
The move also imports a whole other part of the Constitution: The 
Due Process Clause, or Clauses—the Fourteenth Amendment’s for 
the states4 and the Fifth Amendment’s for the federal government5—
for any exercise of jurisdiction in this country must be measured 
against due process. In other words, if the sovereign has no jurisdic-
tion over the offense, the sovereign cannot successively prosecute. 
Here Gamble’s language that the United States might successively 
prosecute for crimes abroad when it has “interests” fits snugly into 
existing due process analyses because both the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Fifth Amendment tests also involve interest analyses.
On this view, one question Gamble opens up is whether a prior 
prosecution might mitigate or erase state interests for purposes of 
due process and, hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause. Indeed, we al-
ready know this to be the case in at least one scenario: where the 
sole interest is in enforcing international law, the United States is 
jurisdictionally barred from successively prosecuting because the 
prior prosecution would have extinguished the only law available—
international law—under which the defendant cannot be prosecuted 
twice. To be sure, this view of double jeopardy was articulated by 
Justice William Johnson in 1820.
Part I of this article is primarily descriptive. It seeks to recruit 
the Court’s own language stretching back to the early 19th century 
to trace the origins and development of the jurisdictional view of 
double jeopardy. Part II also describes the law, in particular Gamble, 
with a focus, first, on the Court’s adoption of a jurisdictional view 
and, second, on the Court’s use of a state-interest analysis to explain 
4  U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
5  U.S. Const. amend. V.
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when the United States might seek successively to prosecute for 
crimes occurring abroad.
Part III contains the meat of the analysis. It attempts to interrelate 
the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses in light of the the dual 
sovereignty doctrine. There is a certain structural appeal here. The 
Double Jeopardy Clause and Due Process Clause protections against 
federal power appear in the same amendment,6 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth Amend-
ment’s double jeopardy protection against the states.7
I begin by explaining that due process depends on state interests 
and that this interest analysis matches up with Gamble’s observation 
that the United States may seek a successive prosecution where it has 
an interest. I then propose that a useful measure of state interests 
can be found in international law. Indeed, this is exactly the body 
of law Gamble used to explain when the United States has an inter-
est in successively prosecuting. International law is an appropriate 
gauge because it captures traditional bases of jurisdiction, and due 
process depends precisely upon traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. Moreover, it is a body of law that courts already 
use when measuring U.S. interests in prosecuting crimes abroad 
under the Due Process Clause. Thus I argue not that international 
law limits a successive prosecution of its own force, but rather that 
it can be incorporated into the Due Process Clause to measure 
state interests. The more attenuated the interest, the weaker the 
jurisdictional claim. When combined with other factors—such as 
the influence one prosecuting entity has over the other, the extent 
to which the entities’ laws and sentencing align, and whether the 
prior prosecution was a sham designed to shield the accused—there 
may be situations where a successively prosecuting state’s interest is 
diminished to the vanishing point.
Exactly what such a disqualification of sovereignty would look 
like in precise fact is largely beyond the prescience of this author; 
my purpose in this short essay is merely to hatch an idea. But we do 
know at least one scenario, alluded to above, in which a U.S. interest 
in successively prosecuting would be erased by a prior prosecution: 
where the sole basis of jurisdiction would be to enforce international 
6  Id.
7  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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law against certain universal crimes like human rights abuses, 
piracy, and certain acts of terrorism.
I. The Jurisdictional View of Sovereignty
This part traces the development of the dual sovereignty doctrine 
as fundamentally a doctrine of jurisdiction. At the outset, it will 
help to break out jurisdiction into three main types: (1) prescriptive; 
(2) adjudicative; and (3) enforcement. Prescriptive jurisdiction is 
generally understood as the power to make and apply law;8 adjudi-
cative jurisdiction is generally understood as the power to subject 
persons and things to judicial process;9 and enforcement jurisdiction 
is generally understood as the power to enforce law.10 These are just 
heuristics, but they do a good job helping distinguish different doc-
trinal tests from one another—for example, the test for personal ju-
risdiction before a court (adjudicative) from the test regarding when 
a state may apply its law for choice of law purposes (prescriptive). 
I propose that the Supreme Court’s dual sovereignty jurisprudence 
can be viewed as upholding successive prosecutions for the same 
crime where prosecuting entities have independent jurisdiction 
to make and apply law, or prescriptive jurisdiction, which in turn 
authorizes independent jurisdiction to enforce that law through a 
separate prosecution.
Two cases from 1820 suggest the dual sovereignty doctrine. The 
first is Houston v. Moore, a case involving state application of a fed-
eral law punishing delinquency from military service.11 As the 
Court explained, “[t]his concerns the jurisdiction of a State military 
tribunal to adjudicate in a case which depends on a law of Congress, 
and to enforce it.”12 Thus the question presented was framed in 
terms of concurrent jurisdiction by courts—not legislatures—over 
the same offense:
Is it competent to a Court Martial, deriving its jurisdiction 
under State authority, to try and punish militia men, drafted, 




11  18 U.S. 1, 4 (1820).
12  Id. at 24–25.
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detached and called forth by the President into the service 
of the United States, who have refused, or neglected to obey 
the call?13
The Court answered yes and observed that the offense was the 
same in both state and federal court because it originated from the 
same—federal—law.14
And here’s where some double jeopardy language came in. Justice 
Bushrod Washington, writing for the Court (sort of15), addressed the 
argument that such a rule “might subject the accused to be twice 
tried for the same offence.”16 Washington rejected this argument, ex-
plaining that “if the jurisdiction of the two courts be concurrent, the 
sentence of either Court, either of conviction or acquittal, might be 
pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other.”17 But again, this 
was only so because the state court was applying federal law, and 
the accused could not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense 
under the same law.18 Houston therefore left the dual sovereignty 
question open; all it stands for is the uncontroversial proposition 
that someone cannot be prosecuted multiple times under the same 
law, and it limited itself to that scenario.19
13  Id. at 16.
14  Id. at 17.
15  As David Currie has noted, “Washington, however, cannot be said to have spoken 
for the Court in Houston” because of the disagreement on the reasoning for the judg-
ment. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred 
Years, 1789–1888 110 (1st ed. 1985). Justice Washington suggested as much, writing at 
the end of his opinion: “Two of the judges are of opinion, that the law in question is 
unconstitutional, and that the judgment below ought to be reversed. The other judges 
are of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed; but they do not concur in all 
respects in the reasons which influence my opinion.” Houston, 18 U.S. at 32. Justice 
Johnson was clear on this, explaining at the end of his concurrence that “there is no 
point whatever decided except that the fine was constitutionally imposed” by the state 
court, and that “[t]he course of reasoning by which the judges have reached this con-
clusion are [sic] various, coinciding in but one thing, viz., that there is no error in the 
judgment [below].” Id. at 47.
16  Houston, 18 U.S. at 31.
17  Id.
18  Washington posited the opposite scenario in which a federal court could not sepa-
rately adjudicate a state civil law cause of action after the state court had already adju-
dicated that same cause of action. Id.
19  See id. at 31–33.
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But Justice Johnson did not so limit himself. Instead, he gave a 
full-throated exposition of the dual sovereignty doctrine as a matter 
of prescriptive jurisdiction, asking rhetorically, “Why may not the 
same offence be made punishable both under the laws of the States, 
and of the United States?”20 He answered:
Every citizen of a State owes a double allegiance; he enjoys 
the protection and participates in the government of both the 
State and the United States. . . . [W]here the United States 
cannot assume, or where they have not assumed [an] exclusive 
exercise of power, I cannot imagine a reason why the States 
may not also, if they feel themselves injured by the same 
offence, assert their right of inflicting punishment also.21
Indeed, “[t]he actual exercise of this concurrent right of punish-
ing is familiar to every day’s practice,” according to Johnson, who 
gave the example of robbing the mail on a highway “which is un-
questionably cognizable as highway-robbery under State laws,” but 
also a federal offense under U.S. law.22 Finally, Johnson turned to the 
consequences of a contrary rule, namely, that states could block a 
successive federal prosecution “when their real object is nothing less 
than to embarrass, the progress of the general government.”23 The 
dual sovereignty rule, on the other hand, would prevent this “evil.”24 
He continued to reject the argument in jurisdictional terms:
But this is a doctrine [prior acquittal as a bar to double 
jeopardy] which can only be maintained on the ground 
that an offence against the laws of the one government is 
an offence against the other government; and can surely 
never be successfully asserted in any instances but those in 
which jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts by statutory 
provisions of the United States. . . . [C]rimes against a 
government are only cognizable in its own Courts, or in 
those which derive their right of holding jurisdiction from 
the offended government.25
20  Id. at 33.
21  Id. at 33–34.
22  Id. at 34.
23  Id. at 35.
24  Id.
25  Id.
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A couple of points come out of Houston. One is that the Court fo-
cused on different forms of jurisdiction when evaluating the double 
jeopardy question. Where multiple prosecutions were posed under 
the same law, or prescriptive jurisdiction, the prohibition on double 
jeopardy would kick in—even if the enforcement agents were differ-
ent courts. But, at least for Justice Johnson, where the laws emanated 
from concurrent but independent prescriptive jurisdictions of dif-
ferent sovereigns, multiple prosecutions were permissible (and, in 
some cases, a good idea). If any doubt remains as to Justice Johnson’s 
views regarding double jeopardy, it ought to be erased by his opin-
ion for the Court in United States v. Furlong,26 decided two weeks 
after Houston.
Furlong was a piracy case. Dicta in the opinion made a sharp dis-
tinction between the parochial crime of murder on the one hand 
and the international crime of piracy on the other.27 This distinc-
tion had an outcome-determinative effect for double jeopardy law 
and practice. Piracy, as a result of a legal fiction, was outside the na-
tional jurisdiction of any state.28 Pirates were by definition stateless 
individuals sailing on stateless vessels acknowledging the author-
ity of no government (hence the black flag).29 Elsewhere, the Court 
described them as “persons on board vessels which throw off their 
national character by cruising piratically and committing piracy 
on other vessels.”30 The crime was not “committed against the par-
ticular sovereignty of a foreign power; but . . . against all nations, 
26  See 18 U.S. (5. Wheat) 184 (1820).
27  Id. at 197.
28  See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820); see also, e.g., 
Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). To ensure that pirates were 
prosecuted wherever they were found and assertions of jurisdiction over them occa-
sioned no interference with the sovereignty of other states, pirates were deemed outside 
of any state’s national jurisdiction; see also Justice Antonin Scalia’s more recent descrip-
tion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748–49 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part). Absent the fiction, prosecution of a pirate in custody for acts occurring outside 
the prosecuting state’s territory theoretically could infringe another state’s sovereignty; 
specifically, the state (or state’s vessel) where the act occurred because, at the time, ju-
risdiction was strictly territorial in nature and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
was seen as interfering with the sovereignty of the state where the crime occurred.
29  See generally David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Real-
ity of Life among the Pirates (1995).
30  Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 153.
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including the United States.”31 All states had jurisdiction over piracy 
not as a matter of their independent national jurisdiction over ter-
ritory or national persons, but instead based on a shared interna-
tional jurisdiction, or what’s called “universal jurisdiction.”32 Furlong 
explained that piracy “is considered as an offence within the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all; 
and there can be no doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit [already 
acquitted] would be good in any civilized State, though resting on 
a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State.”33 
That sounds like the prohibition on double jeopardy.
But, the Court went on, “Not so with the crime of murder.”34 For 
murder, unlike piracy, was not an offense under international law 
“within this universal jurisdiction”35 of all states, but rather was an 
offense against each state’s national laws. “It is punishable under the 
laws of each State, and . . . an acquittal in [the defendant’s] case would 
not have been a good plea in a Court of Great Britain.”36 Moreover, 
unlike with piracy, there was a jurisdictional limitation on prosecut-
ing for murder: “punishing it when committed within the jurisdic-
tion, or, (what is the same thing,) in the vessel of another nation, 
has not been acknowledged as a right, much less an obligation.”37 
In other words, where there was no basis for independent national 
jurisdiction, a state could not prosecute. The Court went on, noting 
that U.S. citizens could nonetheless be subject to international dou-
ble jeopardy by multiple nations with concurrent prescriptive juris-
diction over their crimes: “As to our own citizens . . . their subjection 
to those [U.S.] laws follows them every where,”38 and while the U.S. 
Constitution may protect them from multiple prosecutions under 
31  Id. at 152; cf. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161–62 (1820) (“The 
common law . . . recognises and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own 
municipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations, (which is part of the com-
mon law,) as an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed an 
enemy of the human race.”).
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U.S. law, this protection does not extend to prosecutions under for-
eign law where foreign nations have jurisdiction, for “if [the accused] 
are also made amenable to the laws of another State, it is the result of 
their own act in subjecting themselves to those laws.”39
In sum, Furlong speaks of two types of law emanating from two 
types of jurisdiction: one national, the other international. National 
law derives from states’ independent jurisdiction over national terri-
tory and persons. International law stems from the shared interests 
of all states to proscribe certain offenses that affect the international 
community. Where two states have independent national jurisdic-
tion to prosecute, each may do so because each has an independent 
law and the bar on double jeopardy does not attach. But where inter-
national or universal jurisdiction authorizes the application of only 
international law, multiple prosecutions are prohibited because the 
first state to prosecute would have “used up” the international law 
and a subsequent prosecution would thus, impermissibly, be for the 
same offense, under the same law, twice.
A string of opinions prior to the first actual application of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine in 192240 only cements the jurisdictional reason-
ing in Houston and Furlong. The defendant in Fox v. Ohio challenged her 
state conviction for passing counterfeit coin on the ground that only 
the federal government had jurisdiction over that offense.41 The Court 
disposed of her argument by distinguishing counterfeiting, which 
was an offense exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment to proscribe, from passing counterfeit coin, which was fraud 
within the state’s jurisdiction to proscribe.42 Three years later, United 
States v. Marigold reaffirmed Fox’s jurisdictional holding, explaining 
that the states and Congress each had an independent jurisdiction to 
prosecute and punish uttering false currency.43 Then two years after 
Marigold, Moore v. Illinois solidified the jurisdictional foundation laid 
by the prior case law. Moore involved a challenge to a state court convic-
tion under an Illinois law outlawing the harboring of fugitive slaves.44 
39  Id. at 197–98.
40  United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
41  Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 433 (1847).
42  Id. at 433–34.
43  United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. 560, 569–70 (1850).
44  Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 17 (1852).
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Moore argued that the federal Fugitive Slave Act preempted the 
Illinois statute, a necessary result because otherwise he could be pros-
ecuted twice for the same offense.45 As to the preemption argument, 
the Court found that Illinois had an independent jurisdiction to outlaw 
the harboring of fugitive slaves.46 And as to the related double jeop-
ardy argument, the Court announced the dual sovereignty doctrine:
An offence, in its legal signification, means a transgression of 
a law. . . . Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of 
a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two 
sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction 
of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or 
transgression of the laws of both. . . . That either or both may 
(if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted. 
Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice 
punished for the same offence; but only that by one act he 
has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly 
punishable. He could not plead the punishment by one in bar 
to a conviction by the other.47
Finally, a true dual sovereignty case presented itself. United States v. 
Lanza upheld a successive federal prosecution under the Volstead Act 
after a state conviction for the same acts.48 The Court explained that 
“[e]ach State, as also Congress, may exercise an independent judgment 
in selecting and shaping measures to enforce prohibition. Such as are 
adopted by Congress become laws of the United States and such as are 
adopted by a State become laws of that State.”49 In jurisdictional terms, 
the “independent judgment” to make and enforce law “is an insepara-
ble incident of independent legislative action in distinct jurisdictions.”50 
Indeed, the Court observed that the dual sovereignty “doctrine is thor-
oughly established. But, upon an analysis of the principle on which it 
is founded, it will be found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be 
punished is one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.”51
45  Id.
46  Id. at 18.
47  Id. at 19–20.
48  Lanza, 260 U.S. at 381.
49  Id.
50  Id.
51  Id. at 384 (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439, 445 (1915)) 
(emphasis added).
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The Court repeated this reasoning in subsequent cases upholding 
a federal prosecution following a state court conviction for the same 
act,52 a successive state court conviction following an acquittal of the 
same acts in federal court,53 and a successive federal prosecution fol-
lowing a conviction by an Indian tribunal.54
Moreover, the Court didn’t find dual sovereignties only in respect 
to federal versus state and tribal authorities. In Heath v. Alabama the 
Court considered the case of a man prosecuted twice for a murder 
resulting from a kidnapping in Alabama, with the victim’s body 
being found in Georgia.55 Heath pleaded guilty in Georgia to avoid 
the death penalty, but was then retried in Alabama, where he was 
sentenced to death.56 Before the Alabama trial, Heath leveled two 
challenges: one, he interposed the bar on double jeopardy; two, he 
contested Alabama’s jurisdiction.57 The Court found the jurisdic-
tional challenge waived,58 but there was something to it. It appeared 
that the vast majority of the acts leading up to the murder, including 
the planning, preparation, and murder itself, took place in Georgia 
(though the victim had been kidnapped in Alabama).59 Moreover, 
Heath argued, the offenses for which he was prosecuted were iden-
tical for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,60 and his initial 
conviction in Georgia was the fruit of a joint investigation between 
52  Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
53  Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
54  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 
(2003).
55  Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84 (1985).
56  Id. at 85–86.
57  Id. at 85. Although Heath initially framed this as a “plea to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the Alabama court” (see Brief for Petitioner, Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) 
(No. 84-5555), 1985 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 940 at *10), this argument would more ap-
propriately have been styled as an objection to the application of Alabama law, since 
the court would have had jurisdiction over Heath by virtue of his physical custody.
58  Id. at 87.
59  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 57, at *13–15.
60  Id. at *13. The relevant test here is the so-called Blockburger test. See Blockburger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes 
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof 
of a fact which the other does not.”). For how the Blockburger test might factor into 
this essay’s thesis that due process might constrain a sovereign’s jurisdiction, see infra 
note 135 and accompanying text.
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Georgia and Alabama law enforcement.61 I would only point out 
that, on the analysis developed in Part III, the Court would have had 
to consider Heath’s objections to Alabama’s jurisdiction for it was 
that very jurisdiction, the ability to apply Alabama law to him, that 
made Alabama a “sovereign” within the meaning of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine.
In deciding the case on double jeopardy grounds, the Court basi-
cally restated the dual sovereignty doctrine and then applied it to 
the states. The restatement of the doctrine was largely a recitation of 
quotations from previous cases.62 More interesting was the Court’s 
discussion of why the doctrine applied to successive prosecutions by 
multiple states as opposed to states versus the federal government. 
Here the Court had to discern why, under the dual sovereignty doc-
trine, different states were separate sovereigns. The Court began by 
quoting Lanza’s statement that “[e]ach government in determining 
what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising 
its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”63 That is to say, each gov-
ernment has independent jurisdiction to prescribe law. The Court 
repeated, “each has the power, inherent in any sovereign, indepen-
dently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority 
and to punish such offenses, and in doing so each is exercising its 
own sovereignty, not that of the other.”64 Thus, according to the 
Court, sovereignty really meant independent jurisdiction to make 
and apply law and the attendant jurisdiction to enforce that law.
But the Court did not always find this independent power. Grafton 
v. United States65 is best conceptually understood as the intellec-
tual heir of Houston. Grafton was serving in the U.S. Army in the 
61  Id. at *17. Although not grounded in due process, Heath also made a species of 
interest argument that the prior Georgia prosecution reduced Alabama’s interest and 
that Heath’s individual interest against multiple prosecutions outweighed Alabama’s 
reduced interest. Id. at *27–31. Accord Ronald J. Allen and John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath 
v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 801, 823 (1985) (“A more realistic approach to ascertaining state 
interests than the definitional approach of the Court would have been for the Court to 
examine the extent to which the states actually assert that they have unique interests 
which cannot be satisfied by prior prosecution in another state.”).
62  Heath, 474 U.S. at 88–89 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382; Houston, 18 U.S. at 19, 20).
63  Id. at 89.
64  Id. (cleaned up).
65  Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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then-U.S. territory of the Philippines.66 While on duty, he killed two 
Filipinos and was tried by a military court martial under the Arti-
cles of War.67 He was acquitted and then retried in the Filipino court 
system, where he was convicted of homicide under the Philippine 
Penal Code.68 The Supreme Court explained that the court martial’s 
“jurisdiction is not exclusive, but only concurrent with that of civil 
courts.”69 In other words, there was concurrent adjudicative juris-
diction. That is, “[t]he act done is a civil crime, and the trial is for 
that act. The proceedings are had in a court-martial because the 
offender is personally amenable to that jurisdiction[.]”70 But as to 
prescriptive jurisdiction, it emanated “from the same government, 
namely, that of the United States[.]”71 Indeed, the court martial’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction even depended on the civil penal code: “a 
general court-martial has, under existing statutes, in time of peace, 
jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier of the Army for any offense, 
not capital, which the civil law declares to be a crime against the 
public.”72 Thus the court martial prosecuted Grafton for “the crime 
of homicide as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines.”73 Be-
cause both the court martial and the Filipino Penal Code shared the 
same fundamental prescriptive jurisdiction,
the same acts constituting a crime against the United States 
cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a second 
trial of the accused for that crime in the same or another 
court, civil or military, of the same government.74
Just as in Houston, there was concurrent adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. In Houston, it was the concurrent jurisdiction of state and fed-
eral courts. In Grafton, it was the concurrent jurisdiction of courts 
66  Id. at 341.
67  Id. at 341–42.
68  Id. at 342.
69  Id. at 348.
70  Id. at 347.
71   Id. at 349.
72  Id. at 351.
73  Id. at 349.
74  Id. at 352.
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martial and local civil courts. But in both cases prescriptive juris-
diction drew power from a single source: the federal government. 
Because there was only one source of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
there was only one “offence,” for which the accused could not be 
doubly tried.75
II. Gamble
Throughout the course of the opinion, Gamble uses the jurisdic-
tional view that has been discussed so far. The Court started out 
by explaining, “[w]e have long held that a crime under one sover-
eign’s laws is not ‘the same offence’ as a crime under the laws of 
another sovereign.”76 Thus, “a State may prosecute a defendant under 
state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted him for the 
same conduct under a federal statute.”77 And as we by now know, 
by that reasoning the reverse is true also: a federal prosecution fol-
lowing a state prosecution is permissible, and that’s what happened 
to Gamble. He had been prosecuted by Alabama under a state law 
prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and then prosecuted by 
the federal government for the same acts under a federal felon-in-
possession law.78
75  On the basis that territorial law is derivative of federal law, the Supreme Court 
more recently held that Puerto Rico is not a separate sovereign for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. 
Ct. 1863, 1869–70 (2016) (“Because that [prosecutorial] power originally ‘derived from 
the United States Congress’—i.e., the same source on which federal prosecutors rely—
the Commonwealth could not retry Sánchez Valle and Gómez for unlawfully selling 
firearms.”) (internal citations omitted). On this logic, the Court has also found that a 
municipality is not a distinct sovereign from a state because, like Congress’s power 
over the territories, the state legislature, according to the Florida Constitution, had 
the power “to establish, and to abolish, municipalities, to provide for their govern-
ment, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any 
time.” Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 n.4 (1970) (brackets and internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). This comports with “the traditional view . . . that the 
Supreme Court has predicated the constitutional status of local governments entirely 
on the theory that a local government is merely an administrative arm of the state, 
utterly lacking in autonomy or in constitutional rights against the state that created 
it.” Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 
90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1990).
76  United States v. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019).
77  Id.
78  Id.
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The Court then turned to the text. Here it focused on the word 
“offence” and quoted Justice Antonin Scalia’s “soon-vindicated”79 
dissent in Grady v. Corbin, a case involving whether a single state 
could prosecute for different offenses arising out of the same facts.80 
There, Justice Scalia explained that “the language of the Clause . . . 
protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy ‘for the same 
offence,’ not for the same conduct or actions,” and “‘[o]ffence’ was 
commonly understood in 1791 to mean ‘transgression,’ that is, ‘the 
Violation or Breaking of a Law.’”81 In light of this understanding, 
“[i]f the same conduct violates two (or more) laws, then each offense 
may be separately prosecuted.”82 Gamble transitioned this reasoning 
into the dual sovereignty context through the following syllogism: 
“an ‘offence’ is defined by a law, and each law is defined by a sover-
eign. So where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two 
‘offenses.’”83 This implicitly raises the question of what constitutes 
a “sovereign.” As I hope to have shown by now, a sovereign is an 
entity that enjoys independent power to make and apply law, or pre-
scriptive jurisdiction.
The Court next turned to the cases.84 Unsurprisingly, it rehearsed 
the dual sovereignty reasoning of Fox, Marigold, and Moore.85 But 
what’s interesting here is the Court’s heavy emphasis on “the sub-
stantive differences between the interests that two sovereigns can 
have in punishing the same act.”86 Hence the Court did not stop at an 
antiseptic jurisdictional reading of these opinions; rather, it went out 
of its way to “honor” the different federal and state interests at play in 
79  Id. at 1965.
80  Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
81  Id. at 529 (internal citations omitted).
82  Id.
83  Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965. The Court also quoted parenthetically Moore’s state-
ment that “[t]he constitutional provision is not, that no person shall be subject, for the 
same act, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; but for the same offence, the same 
violation of law, no person’s life or limb shall be twice put in jeopardy.” Id. (quoting 
Moore, 55 U.S. at 17) (internal emphasis omitted).
84  I should note that Houston v. Moore and United States v. Furlong were discussed in 
the Court’s opinion, but were done so later on in the part of the opinion dealing with 
Gamble’s arguments, which relied on those cases. See id. at 1976–79. The Court’s read-
ing of both cases is consistent with the argument presented here.
85  Id. at 1966–67.
86  Id. at 1966.
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the successive prosecution scenarios illustrated by the cases. In Fox, 
it was the state’s interest in prohibiting the passing of counterfeit 
coin;87 and in Marigold, a case involving uttering false currency, the 
crime was measured by its “character in reference to each” pros-
ecuting entity.88 Moore, according to the Court, “expanded on this 
concern for the different interests of separate sovereigns”89 by de-
scribing the hypothetical assault on a U.S. marshal that would of-
fend both national (“hindering the execution of legal process”90) and 
state (“breaching the peace of the State”91) interests.92
And then the Court veered off the precedential track, so to speak. It 
speculated about the implications of Gamble’s theory when it comes 
to prosecuting for crimes abroad. The Court worried that “[i]f . . . only 
one sovereign may prosecute for a single act, no American court—
state or federal—could prosecute conduct already tried in a foreign 
court.”93 What about a U.S. national murdered abroad? In keeping 
with an interest analysis, the country where the murder occurred 
could “rightfully seek to punish the killer” because “[t]he foreign 
country’s interest lies in protecting the peace in that territory rather 
than protecting the American specifically.”94 But the United States 
would also have an interest: the interest not to see its nationals 
killed—an interest captured by “customary international law.”95 Or 
we may have other “key national interests,” among which might be 
“punishing crimes committed by U.S. nationals abroad.”96 The Court 
then repeated its interest approach in no uncertain terms: “a crime 
against two sovereigns constitutes two offenses because each sover-




90  Id. at 1966–67 (cleaned up).
91  Id. at 1967 (cleaned up).
92  That the Court chose not to “honor” the specific facts and laws at play in Moore 
is not that surprising. The case involved upholding a state prosecution for harboring 
fugitive slaves. Moore, 55 U.S. at 17.
93  Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967.
94  Id.
95  Id.
96  Id. (emphasis in original).
97  Id.
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If sovereign means jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is triggered by 
interests, what interests count? And, can they ever be mitigated 
by a prior prosecution so as to render a successive prosecution 
unconstitutional?
III. Due Process and Double Jeopardy
Before answering those questions, we must give them some con-
stitutional context. Any exercise of jurisdiction in this country must 
comply with due process. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause regulates assertions of state power98 while the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause regulates the federal govern-
ment.99 The relevant type of jurisdiction for our purposes is, again, 
prescriptive—or the power to make and apply law. Unlike in civil 
cases, criminal cases do not proceed in absentia in the United States, 
so the court will always have personal, adjudicative jurisdiction 
over the accused (even if custody is obtained by force or fraud).100 
The applicable Supreme Court test for discerning whether an asser-
tion of prescriptive jurisdiction comports with due process requires 
that a state have “a significant contact or significant aggregation 
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is nei-
ther arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”101 That is the test under 
the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court has not yet resolved the test 
under the Fifth Amendment. But lower courts that have considered 
the matter agree that Fifth Amendment due process applies so as not 
to render the application of federal law “arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair.”102 The tests vary, but all appear to have found this “common 
denominator.”103
98  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
99  U.S. Const. amend. V.
100  See Anthony J. Colangelo, Spatial Legality, 107 Nw. L. Rev. 69, 84 (2012); Anthony 
J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 1303, 1330 
nn.139–41 (2014).
101  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (emphasis added).
102  See, e.g., United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 966 
(9th Cir. 1995).
103  United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 262 (D.D.C. 2013). See also United 
States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Cato Supreme Court review
206
In recent years, both the states104 and the federal government105 have 
been experimenting with stretching jurisdiction beyond territorial 
borders. The federal government in particular has begun projecting 
U.S. law abroad in aggressive and unprecedented ways.106 This boom 
of what’s called “extraterritorial jurisdiction” has triggered a spike in 
due process challenges to the application of U.S. law abroad.107 I want 
to use these jurisdictional assertions to build out and illustrate my 
argument interrelating the Due Process Clauses and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause; namely, if we take seriously due process and combine it 
with the interest analysis suggested by Gamble, there may be situa-
tions in which a prior prosecution might mitigate a successively pros-
ecuting state’s interest so as to render subsequent application of its 
law arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, thus vitiating the state’s status 
as sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Recall, al-
though the dual sovereignty “doctrine is thoroughly established . . . 
[u]pon an analysis of the principle on which it is founded, it will be 
found to relate only to cases where the act sought to be punished is 
one over which both sovereignties have jurisdiction.”108
104  U.S. states have for the most part adopted statutes, based on the Model Penal 
Code, that enlarge their territorial jurisdiction to encompass conduct within the state 
that leads to, or is intended to lead to, a harmful result outside the state, as well as 
conduct outside the state that leads to, or is intended to lead to, a harmful result inside 
the state. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 16.4(c) (4th ed. 2014). The 
constitutionality of this legislation has been held not to violate due process “[b]ecause 
such legislation adheres to the territoriality principle.” Id.
105  See infra notes 111–16.
106  These jurisdictional assertions have led to a substantial number of international 
double jeopardy cases in U.S. courts. See, e.g., United States v. Alcocer Roa, 753 F. 
App’x 846 (11th Cir. 2018) (U.S. prosecution following Panamanian prosecution); 
United States v. Ducuara De Saiz, 511 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2013) (prior Colombian 
prosecution); United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2010) (prior South Korean 
prosecution); United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (prior Greek 
prosecution); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d, 1121, 1126–27 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (prior 
Maltese prosecution); United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (prior 
Dutch Antillean prosecution); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1362 
(11th Cir. 1994) (prior Bahamian prosecution); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 
F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984) (prior Malaysian prosecution); United States v. McRary, 
616 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1980) (prior Cuban prosecution); United States v. Richardson, 
580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978) (prior Guatemalan proceedings); United States v. 
Martin, 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior Bahamian prosecution).
107  See infra notes 111–16.
108  Lanza, 260 U.S. at 384 (quoting S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. at 445).
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Because federal extraterritoriality over crimes abroad promises 
to be the most fast-moving and controversial area going forward, 
this analysis focuses principally on that scenario. As noted, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a state 
have contacts creating state interests such that application of its law 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.109 The same type of 
reasoning permeates Fifth Amendment due process regarding ex-
tensions of federal law. Courts began articulating Fifth Amendment 
due process as a “nexus” requirement,110 and this test still prevails 
in some circuits.111 Other circuits have rejected112 or atrophied it.113 
Despite the varying tests, however, it should come as no surprise 
that courts approving the extension of U.S. law abroad have found 
it to be in the United States’s interests to do so. This is not to say 
that courts always come out and announce, “It is in the interests 
109  Allstate Ins. Co., 449 U.S. at 312–13 (1981).
110  United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that due process re-
quires a “sufficient nexus” such that application of U.S. law is not “arbitrary or funda-
mentally unfair”) (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1991)).
111  Id. See also United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying 
nexus test in prosecution for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, among other charges).
112  United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1186 (11th Cir. 2016) (Due process 
does not require a nexus between the defendants and the United States in a suit 
brought under the MDLEA.); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 
2014) (same). United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375–77 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that no nexus is required where the flag nation consented or waived objection to en-
forcement); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) (same); United 
States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that Congress 
may override a nexus requirement.).
113  See, e.g., United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding an 
exception to the nexus requirement where the offense is subject to universal jurisdic-
tion). Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119 (finding an exception to the nexus requirement where 
conduct is “self-evidently” criminal); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73 
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding an exception to the nexus requirement when defendants are 
aboard “stateless vessels”); Ali, 718 F.3d at 943–44 (finding an exception to the nexus 
requirement when a treaty exists on the substance of cause of action); United States 
v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2008) (no nexus required where acts took place on 
a stateless vessel); United States v. White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (E.D. Cal. 1997) 
(“[W]here the government seeks to prosecute a United States citizen for acts occurring 
in foreign lands, due process does not require a demonstration of ‘nexus.’”). Although 
the tests may look different on the surface, they all coalesce around international law 
principles of jurisdiction to determine whether an assertion of jurisdiction is arbitrary 
or fundamentally unfair.
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of the United States to apply our law in this situation.”114 Rather, 
courts tend to draw from an established source of markers for state 
interests— indeed, the same source that the Court in Gamble drew 
from: international law.115
As discussed in Part II, Gamble spoke of a U.S. interest in succes-
sively prosecuting where a U.S. national is injured abroad116—or 
what is called the passive-personality basis of jurisdiction117—and 
where crimes are committed by U.S. nationals abroad118—or the 
active- personality basis of jurisdiction.119 And it explicitly noted 
that international law permits jurisdiction on these bases to support 
114  Though some courts have explicitly said that where it is in the “interest” of the 
United States to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, due process is satisfied—and in the 
international double jeopardy context to boot. See White, 51 F. Supp. at 1011 (uphold-
ing jurisdiction on the basis of defendant’s U.S. citizenship [the nationality basis of 
jurisdiction under international law] because “[t]he interest of the United States in this 
case can hardly be questioned.”); see also United States v. Murillo, 826 F.3d 152, 157 
(4th Cir. 2016) (holding that “it is not arbitrary to prosecute a defendant in the United 
States if his actions affected significant American interests—even if the defendant did 
not mean to affect those interests”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115  United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Compliance with in-
ternational law satisfies due process because it puts a defendant on notice that he 
could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United States.”) (internal citation and quo-
tation marks omitted); Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553 (“In determining whether due process 
is satisfied, we are guided by principles of international law”; finding due process 
satisfied by relying on the interests created by the territorial principle and the protec-
tive principle); United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“In determining whether an extraterritorial law comports with due process, 
appellate courts often consult international law principles such as the objective prin-
ciple, the protective principle, or the territorial principle.”); Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2 
(“[i]nternational law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a sufficient 
nexus exists between the defendant and the United States”); Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. at 
262 (“whatever the Due Process Clause requires, it is satisfied where the United States 
applies its laws extraterritorially pursuant to the universality principle” of interna-
tional law) (internal citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 
393 (5th Cir. 2016) (relying on objective territoriality in finding due process satisfied); 
Murillo, 826 F.3d at 157–58 (relying on passive personality in finding due process satis-
fied); Clark, 435 F.3d at 1108–09 (relying on nationality or active personality in finding 
due process satisfied); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding 
jurisdiction under the protective principle where “planned attacks were intended to 
affect the United States and to alter its foreign policy”).
116  Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967.
117  Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 411.
118  Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967.
119  Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 410.
Gamble, Dual Sovereignty, and Due Process
209
its analysis.120 Add to this list subjective territoriality (where conduct 
occurs or has been initiated on the state’s territory),121 objective ter-
ritoriality (where part but not necessarily all of the conduct is com-
pleted on the state’s territory122), and “effects” jurisdiction (where 
conduct has or is intended to have an effect on the state’s territory, 
even if the conduct occurs elsewhere).123 Then there’s the so-called 
protective principle, which authorizes jurisdiction where conduct 
affects official state functions or the security of the state.124 Finally, 
there’s universal jurisdiction,125 already introduced in the discussion 
of Furlong.126 This basis of jurisdiction essentially holds that certain 
offenses under international law are so harmful, any state in the 
world can prosecute the perpetrators.127 The idea here, as I’ve ar-
gued, is that the state is not applying its national law to the accused, 
but rather is acting as the decentralized enforcement agent for an 
international law that covers the globe.128
None of this is to suggest that these bases of jurisdiction on their 
own have the force of law in U.S. courts such that if the United States 
exceeds its jurisdiction under international law, the exercise of juris-
diction is unconstitutional. Rather, the argument is more subtle. It 
seeks in effect to incorporate these jurisdictional principles into the 
Due Process Clause to measure the strength of a U.S. interest in suc-
cessively prosecuting. In short, the jurisdictional bases are proxies 
for interests. The further away from the bases one gets, the less the 
interest, and the less a successive prosecution complies with due 
process and, hence, the Double Jeopardy Clause.
At this stage, a couple of points must be addressed. One in-
volves the argument that these particular bases ought to serve as 
baselines, such that the further away one gets from a basis, the more 
120  Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967.
121  Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 408 cmt. c.
122  Id.
123  Id. at § 409.
124  Id. at § 412.
125  Id. at § 413.
126  See supra notes 26–40.
127  See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 413.
128  Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” 
of Laws, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 881 (2009). See also Ali, 718 F.3d at 935 (“Universal jurisdic-
tion is not some idiosyncratic domestic invention but a creature of international law.”).
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attenuated the interest. Who’s to say that these bases, as opposed to 
other bases—say, the place where the family of the accused lives—
ought to provide the constitutional touchstone? The answer is that 
these bases capture the traditional rationales upon which states as-
sert jurisdiction; indeed, it is for this very reason that they embody 
customary international law.129 And due process cares deeply about 
tradition, for it requires that any assertion of jurisdiction obey “tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”130 Satisfaction 
of this criterion, in turn, avoids the exercise of jurisdiction being 
“arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”131 It is not arbitrary because the 
state has a recognized basis under an established body of law ap-
plicable to all on which to apply its law. And it is not fundamentally 
unfair because the individual defendant is on notice that the state’s 
law may apply to him on a recognized basis under an established 
body of law applicable to all.132
The next point transitions to the double jeopardy discussion. So 
far we have been talking only about how attenuated the interest 
must be from traditional bases of jurisdiction for it to violate the 
Constitution. This question must be complicated, however. If that 
were the end of the discussion, it would be no different from the 
question of whether the United States has jurisdiction to begin with, 
which is something courts have been wrestling with for roughly a 
quarter century. The confounding variable for the present analysis is 
the prior prosecution. More specifically, the constitutional question 
129  Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 101 cmt. a (“cus-
tomary international law . . . results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed out of a sense of international legal right or obligation.”).
130  Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (quoting Int’l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court 
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). I realize that citing 
these cases adds to the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis considerations about adjudi-
cative jurisdiction and, particularly, personal jurisdiction. However, as Justice William 
Brennan, paraphrasing Justice Hugo Black, has pointed out, “both inquiries are of-
ten closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar considerations.” 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224–25 (1977) (internal citation omitted). Requiring 
traditional bases of jurisdiction also provides a constraint on states from inventing or 
manufacturing novel interests upon which to apply their laws in extravagant ways.
131  Supra note 102.
132  Fair notice of the law is a primary consideration in due process analysis. See 
Colangelo, Spatial Legality, supra note 100, at 81.
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is whether an attenuated interest combined with a prior prosecution 
comports with due process.
Here I want to propose other factors that may inform this calculus 
on an interest analysis: (a) the degree of influence the entity seeking 
successively to prosecute has on the initial prosecuting entity; (b) the 
degree to which the laws and sentencing align; and (c) the degree 
to which the foreign prosecution is a sham designed to shield the 
accused. Each of these factors can instruct whether the successively 
prosecuting state’s interest has been sufficiently vindicated so as to 
render another prosecution unconstitutional.
As to the degree of influence one prosecuting entity has on the 
other, the more influence, the more both states’ interests would ap-
pear to be vindicated by a single prosecution. Courts have already 
carved out an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine that would 
bar a successive prosecution by a separate sovereign where “one 
sovereign so thoroughly dominates or manipulates the prosecuto-
rial machinery of another that the latter retains little or no volition 
in its own proceedings.”133 I agree that this must be a high bar as a 
factor contributing to disqualifying sovereignty under the dual sov-
ereignty doctrine lest it create a perverse incentive for prosecuting 
entities not to engage in beneficial communication and cooperation 
at the expense of giving up the right to prosecute successively.134
As to the laws aligning, the relevant test for double jeopardy pur-
poses is the Blockburger test.135 It provides that “where the same act 
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory pro-
visions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two 
133  United States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 827 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 
See also United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1037 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987).
134  See Rashed, 234 F.3d at 1281 (“U.S. assistance was so pervasive that Greece gath-
ered little of the presented evidence independently. But [the exception] acknowledges 
that extensive law enforcement and prosecutorial cooperation between two sovereigns 
does not make a trial by either a sham.”). This is not to say that the bar could never be 
met and such a foreign state prosecution could never qualify for the exception. See id. 
at 1283 (“An easy case, for example, might be where a nation pursued a prosecution 
that did little or nothing to advance its independent interests, under threat of with-
drawal of American aid on which its leadership was heavily dependent. But where the 
United States simply lends a foreign government investigatory resources, the manipu-
lation moniker is out of the question.”).
135  See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
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offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a 
fact which the other does not.”136 If the laws match up under this test 
such that the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, the 
less a successive prosecution would seem appropriate.137 Sentencing 
can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,138 but it obviously also fac-
tors into whether the previous trial is a sham. According to the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, if the proceedings were 
undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility,” they would constitute a sham trial.139 The 
more the previous trial looks like it was designed to shield the ac-
cused from criminal responsibility, the more appropriate a succes-
sive prosecution. A context-sensitive analysis that takes into account 
these factors and a successively prosecuting entity’s degree of ju-
risdictional connection with the crime, as measured by established 
bases that capture state interests, provides a sophisticated and work-
able constitutional test.
At the very least there is one scenario, raised by Furlong back in 
1820, in which the United States would be barred from successively 
136  Id.
137  This was the case in Heath, for example. As Heath’s counsel argued, “the elements 
of the two statutes being virtually indistinguishable, the Blockburger ‘same elements’ 
test is also satisfied.” Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 57, at *8. The Court brushed 
this type of argument aside, flatly observing that “[i]f the States are separate sover-
eigns, as they must be under the definition of sovereignty which the Court consis-
tently has employed, the circumstances of the case are irrelevant.” Heath, 474 U.S. 
at 92. It is submitted that, as Part I demonstrated, the definition of sovereignty hinges 
on jurisdiction, and a jurisdictional analysis based on state interests may well consider 
the degree to which the laws align to measure whether the successively prosecuting 
state’s interests have been satisfied.
138  Defendants in United States v. Richardson were let go upon purchasing their 
freedom in Guatemala; the court noted that a successive U.S. prosecution was ap-
propriate in part because they “were permitted to avoid prison terms by paying a 
relatively small sum of money.” 580 F.2d 946, 947 (1978). See also Rashed, 234 F.3d at 
1281 (U.S. successive prosecution where defendant was released by Greek authori-
ties after eight years following conviction for, among other things, aircraft bombing 
and murder, which under U.S. law carries a sentence of death or life imprisonment); 
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1125–27 (U.S. successive prosecution where defendant was released 
by Maltese authorities after seven years following conviction for hostage taking and 
murder, which under a U.S. law prohibiting air piracy carries a sentence of death or 
life imprisonment).
139  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90.
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prosecuting under a jurisdictional view. Suppose the United States 
seeks successively to prosecute a foreign perpetrator of piracy, ter-
rorism, torture, or genocide not explicitly linked to U.S. territory 
or nationals. There are a host of statutes on the books authoriz-
ing and arguably even mandating a U.S. prosecution in respect of 
these crimes if the United States gets personal jurisdiction over 
the alleged perpetrators.140 And we have pursued such prosecu-
tions.141 But under international law, there would be no recognized 
national interest regarding U.S. territory or persons upon which to 
apply uniquely U.S. national law. The only interest (and indeed, 
authorization) would be the enforcement of international law, as 
implemented in the U.S. code, under the principle of universal ju-
risdiction. If a foreign nation gets there first and applies interna-
tional law (via a prosecution resting on a national basis of juris-
diction or resting on universal jurisdiction), the United States may 
not do so again. Now, this would require applying the definition 
of the offense under international law in the foreign prosecution. 
But that would largely be the case where foreign law implements 
the international treaty proscribing the offense in question, since 
treaties largely embody customary international law definitions 
of universal crimes.142
140  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(2)(C) (American jurisdiction exists to prosecute for 
bombing occurring outside the U.S. when “a perpetrator is found in the United 
States.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2)(D) (genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(2) 
(torture); 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b)(2)(C) (aircraft piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (hostage 
taking); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (piracy); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(2)(B) (financing terrorism). 
These statutes largely implement international treaties to which we are party, which 
mandate that we prosecute or extradite offenders found within our territory. See, 
e.g., International Convention for the Suppresion of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 
9(4), Sept. 14, 2005, S. Treaty Doc. No, 110-4, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89; Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 5(2), 
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
141  See e.g., Ali, 718 F.3d at 942, 944 (universal jurisdiction over hostage taking); Shi, 
525 F.3d at 722–23 (universal jurisdiction over piracy).
142  Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Ter-
rorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 121, 
176–85 (2007). The treaties do not contemplate a bar on double jeopardy by multiple 
sovereigns. Rezaq, 134 F. 3d at 1129.
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Conclusion
There exists a lens through which the Supreme Court’s dual sov-
ereignty jurisprudence coheres. That lens has been crafted by the 
Court’s language throughout the history of the doctrine, spanning 
back to 1820. It provides that “sovereign” really means independent 
jurisdiction to make and apply law. Because any exercise of juris-
diction must comply with due process, the next question becomes 
how to measure jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clauses. Gamble gave a clue when it explained that historically dif-
ferent sovereigns were justified in prosecuting successively when 
they had an interest in doing so, and suggested that the United States 
might prosecute successively for a foreign crime when that crime 
touches U.S. interests as measured by international law.
This discussion of interests fits nicely with traditional due pro-
cess tests that require established interests for a state to apply its law. 
And when it comes to extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction, the 
established interests are found in international law, as Gamble indi-
cated. The further the assertion of jurisdiction gets from these bases, 
the weaker the assertion of jurisdiction becomes as a matter of due 
process. Combined with other factors—such as the degree of influ-
ence a successively prosecuting state has over the initial prosecu-
tion, the degree to which the prior prosecution implements laws that 
align with those of the successively prosecuting state, and the extent 
to which the prior prosecution is a sham, a nuanced and managable 
new test emerges. Finally, where a successive prosecution is based 
only on the interest in enforcing international law and the prior 
prosecution has already used that same law, the successive prosecu-
tion is barred under a jurisdictional view.
